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Decisionmaking under risk is central to humanbehavior. Economic decision theory suggests that value, risk, and risk aversion influence
choice behavior. Although previous studies identified neural correlates of decision parameters, the contribution of these correlates to
actual choices is unknown. In two different experiments, participants chose between risky and safe options.We identified discrete blood
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) correlates of value and risk in the ventral striatumand anterior cingulate, respectively. Notably, increas-
ing inferior frontal gyrus activity to low risk and safe options correlated with higher risk aversion. Importantly, the combination of these
BOLD responses effectively decoded the behavioral choice. Striatal value and cingulate risk responses increased the probability of a risky
choice, whereas inferior frontal gyrus responses showed the inverse relationship. These findings suggest that the BOLD correlates of
decision factors are appropriate for an ideal observer to detect behavioral choices.More generally, these biological data contribute to the
validity of the theoretical decision parameters for actual decisions under risk.
Introduction
Consider somebody selling you a lottery ticket offering £40 or
£60, depending on the flip of a coin. You decide to pay up to £50
to buy this ticket. Conversely, your friend might consider this
ticket as risky and pay a maximum of £45. Although both of you
face exactly the same average payoff, your reactions are different
and vary between risk neutrality (you) and risk avoidance (your
friend). Such decisions involving risky options characterize a
wide spectrum of human and animal behavior.
Faced with such situations, the agent should accumulate in-
formation about the characteristics of the different options and
synthesize them to select an alternative. Typically, options with
higher expected value (EV) (i.e., the sum of each possible out-
come weighted by its probability) are preferred, all other things
being equal. However, the introduction of risk influences the
subjective value (or utility) attached to a risky option (or gam-
ble). The influence of risk depends on individual attitudes toward
risk, with increasing risk aversion reducing the utility of the gamble.
Therefore, decision making is a function of the statistical
properties of the options offered (value and risk), with the influ-
ence of risk being modulated by the subjective evaluation of the
riskiness of the gamble (risk aversion). Risk-averse agents need to
trade off between value and risk, suggesting that these twoparam-
eters are two competing dimensions.
Previous research has begun to identify BOLD responses re-
lated to expected value, risk, and risk aversion. Neuroimaging
experiments in humans suggest that ventral striatum (VSt) activ-
ity increases with EV or its components (magnitude and proba-
bility) (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001, 2005; Abler et al.,
2006; Yacubian et al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Rolls et al., 2008).
Conversely, activity of the anterior cingulate (ACC) has been
associated with the volatility of reward environment (Behrens et
al., 2007) and the variability of expected outcomes (Critchley et
al., 2001; Brown and Braver, 2005, 2008; Kuhnen and Knutson,
2005). Dorsal ACC (dACC) has been related to directing action
selection for uncertain rewards (Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007).
Although neural correlates of EV and risk have been extensively
studied, the neural basis of attitudes toward risk in a choice situ-
ation is less well described (Tobler et al., 2007). Yet, the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been implicated
in the modification of risk attitudes (Knoch et al., 2006; Fecteau
et al., 2007).
However, it is less well known whether these parameter-
related BOLD signals merely reflect the characteristics of the
choice situation or actually carry information that combines to
contribute to the choice process. We hypothesized that BOLD
signals in different brain structures reflecting key decision pa-
rameters can combine in a way that allows an ideal observer to
detect the nature (risky or safe) of the behavioral choice during
risky decision making. To investigate this hypothesis, in two dif-
ferent experimental paradigms, we identified BOLD responses
preferentially encoding value [magnitude (first experiment)
and/or expected value (second experiment)] risk and risk aversion.
Subsequently, we used these parameter-specific responses to test the
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extent to which they could detect the choice behavior and decode
their contribution to the probability of a risky or a safe choice.
Materials andMethods
Definitions
Objective risk
Under certain conditions, risk can be objectively defined. Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970) provide a formal, minimal definition of risk and charac-
terize it as the spread of outcomes, with the condition that the EV of
options is preserved. For example, a gamble equiprobably ( p  0.5)
offering 10 or 90 points (10/90) is riskier than a gamble equiprobably
offering 40/60. Probabilities and EV are the same, but risk is different. In
this study, we follow the Rothschild–Stiglitz definition of risk as a mean-
preserving increase in the spread of outcomes.
This definition is analogous to risk measures
such as SD and variance in skewness free distri-
butions with the other moments kept constant
(e.g., expected value/mean). Notice that the
gambles used in this study also coincide with
other definitions of risk (coefficient of varia-
tion) (Weber et al., 2004; McCoy and Platt,
2005).
Subjective risk (risk aversion)
Conversely, risk aversion is subjective. The de-
gree of risk aversion can be behaviorally dem-
onstrated within a psychophysical framework
by identifying the safe amount for which the
agent is indifferent in choices against a risky
outcome (Luce, 2000) (Fig. 1A). This indiffer-
ence amount, or certainty equivalent (CE),
precisely reflects the value attached to the risky
option and allows for comparisons between
different options and their expressions across
individuals. For instance, a risk-neutral agent
will attach the sameCE to both 40/60 and 10/90
gambles. On the contrary, a risk-averse deci-
sion maker will be affected by the increase of
risk from the 40/60 to the 10/90 gamble and
will lower her CE for the riskier option. Hence,
the difference between the certainty equiva-
lents of each gamble reflects the degree of risk
aversion of the agent.
Participants
All participants were right-handed, had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were
screened to exclude those with a previous his-
tory of neurological or psychiatric disease. All
gave informed written consent. The Local Re-
search Ethics Committee (National Hospital
for Neurology andNeurosurgery and the Insti-
tute of Neurology Joint Research Ethics Com-
mittee) approved the study. In the first
experiment, three risk-seeking participants
were excluded. One more participant was ex-
cluded (and not scanned) because she or he vio-
lated monotonicity. These participants were not
scanned. Restriction to risk-averse agents was
done to ensurehomogeneity of data and straight-
forward evaluation of results. In the second ex-
periment, there were no risk-attitude-related
exclusioncriteria; still all participantsmoreor less
exhibited risk aversion (see Results), which is in
accordance with numerous studies suggesting
that persons predominantly exhibit risk-averse
preferences (Binswanger, 1980; Holt and Laury,
2002; Dohmen et al., 2005).
Experimental tasks and behavior
First experiment
All participants made repeated choices between a risky (“gamble”) and a
safe alternative, offering a single amount with certainty. In the first ex-
periment (n 13;mean age of 24.5 years, five females), two gambleswere
offered, one resulting in either 40 or 60 points (low risk gamble) and one,
riskier, resulting in either 10 or 90 points (high risk gamble), in which
each outcomehad an equal probability ( p 0.5) of occurrence (Fig. 1C).
Participants were paid according to the cumulative total amount of
points (converted to real money) they acquired during the experiment.
For the first experiment, we adjusted the value of the safe options
according to the risk preferences of each participant. We did this to
ensure that, within each choice set, the alternatives had the sameutility [it
Figure1. Task and behavioral results.A, Psychophysical definition of certainty equivalent. The CE of a gamble is the amount for
which an agent is indifferent between receiving it for sure and opting for the gamble. This definition implies that the probability of
choosing the CE instead of the gamble is p 0.5. Examples show probability distributions of safe choices as a function of safe
amounts for twoparticipantswith different degrees of risk aversion (thick line for stronger risk aversionwith lower CE).B, Iterative
determination of CE. In each trial, participants chose between a safe and a risky option. The staircase method (PEST procedure)
iteratively adjusted the safe option in consecutive trials to approximate choice indifference between the two options. Lines show
data fromtwoparticipantswithdifferent CEs (thicker line representshigher risk aversion). The shapeof eachdot illustrates safe and
risky choices. Vertical lines indicate good approximation of indifference values and mark onset of scanning. C, Choice options as
presented to participants (first experiment). Participants chose between either a safe option or one of two gambles with two
equiprobable outcomes (40/60 and 10/90, respectively). Each screen shows a safe (left) and a risky option, the safe value being set
to choice indifference. The first row represents the choice set a less risk-averseparticipant faced,whereas the second row the choice
set of a very risk-averse participant. The first column represents the low risk condition (choices involving the low risk gamble),
whereas the second column represents the high risk condition (choices involving the high risk gamble).D, Differential assessment
of keydecisionparameters: EV, risk (as increase in spread), andutility. Each comparison serves to identifydifferences in twoof these
parameters. Comparison A tests differences in risk and utility but not EV; comparison B tests EV and utility, controlling for risk. E, CE
of participants. CEs of individual participants for the two gambles (40/60 and 10/90) are displayed according to increasing risk
aversion. Lower CEs, and larger differences between CEs for the twogambles, indicate increasing risk aversion. F, Choice options as
presented to participants (second experiment). Participants again chose between a safe and an even-chance gamble. This time,
four gambles were used: the first two (offering £10 or £50 and £15 or £45, respectively) had expected value of £30, whereas the
other two (offering £40 or £80 and £30 or £90, respectively) had an expected value of £60. For gambles with the same expected
value, onewas riskier than theother. Importantly, safe alternativeswerenot set to indifference level but took semi-randomvalues.
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should be underlined that the concept of utility as used here refers to
decision utility, i.e., an ordering representing preference, and not to ex-
perienced utility, which refers to the pleasure derived from the consump-
tion of an outcome (Kahneman et al., 1997)]. To achieve this, we
approximated, before scanning, the CEs for both gambles for each par-
ticipant, using a staircase method (Fig. 1B) [parameter estimation by
sequential testing (PEST)] (Luce, 2000) (supplemental data, available at
www.jneurosci.org as supplementalmaterial). During scanning (Fig. 1B,
trials after the vertical lines), the safe alternatives were initially set to the
corresponding, previously determined, approximated CE; consequently,
their value was updated to accommodate temporal variations in risk
aversion. This method ensured an approximately equal number of risky
and safe choices [by  2 test, all comparisons were nonsignificant (NS)],
which reflected indifference between the values of the safe alternative and
the risky gamble. In addition, choices between risky and safe options
were independent of the previous choices and did not constitute simple
alternations ( p  0.1). Therefore, by the overt behavioral preferences
shown (“revealed preferences”), for each participant the utilities of a
gamble and its safe alternative were the same, because both were equally
preferred.
Choice trials were randomly interspersedwith no-choice trials. In each
choice trial, participants were presented, on a computer monitor, with two
alternatives (Fig. 1D) (supplemental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material), randomly positioned to the left and right of an
ocular fixation cross (evaluation phase). Participants had always to
choose between a risky and a safe option. Two risky options with
equiprobable outcomes were used (40/60 and 10/90). After 5.5 s, the
fixation cross was circled (“go” signal), signaling that the participant
should press a button to indicate her choice. If the participant failed to
respond within 600 ms, an error message appeared. In correct trials, the
circled cross remained on the screen until 1000 ms had elapsed; subse-
quently, the choice was framed for a randomperiodwith an average of 4 s
(2 s fixed plus 2 s variable according to a exponential distribution trun-
cated at 15 s), allowing temporal decorrelation (via jittering) (Dale, 1999)
between choice and outcome phase. Subsequently, the outcome of the
choice was shown for 1 s. A cross, to which participants had to fixate,
appeared for the same random period, indicating the onset of a new trial.
Fixation was added to allow temporal decorrelation of the outcome
phase with the presentation of options in the next trial. No-choice trials
had exactly the same sequence of screens as choice trials, with the excep-
tion that, during the presentation of options, a small arrow placed next to
the fixation cross indicated what the choice should be (left or right). The
participant had to press the corresponding button; otherwise, an error
screen was shown.
Structure of experiment. The actual experiment started with an “esti-
mation session,” during the acquisition of structural images. During the
estimation session, we approximated the CE of each participant, for both
gambles. This was followed by three sessions of the task (“main ses-
sions”), during which functional scans were acquired.
Main (scanned) sessions. After the estimation session, each participant
played three main sessions, during which functional images were ac-
quired. During each session, the participant faced 20  2 (choice/no-
choice) 2 (high/low risk) 80 trials minus the errors (average errors
per participant was 4.7).
To ensure an approximately equal number of safe and risky choices,
denoting that the risky and safe alternatives have the same utility, the safe
alternative was updated according to a PEST-like algorithm that took
into account previous choices (supplemental data, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
The payment method limited wealth effects and diversification strat-
egies (supplemental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemen-
tal material).
Estimating certainty equivalent. Because of the updating algorithm, the
values of the safe alternative during scanning reflected indifference with
the risky option, adjusted for temporal variations in risk aversion. For
each participant and gamble, the median of these values was set to be the
corresponding CE.
Second experiment
Structure of experiment. In experiment 2, a separate group of 14 partici-
pants had again to choose between a risky and a safe option. The main
changes were as follows: (1) the outcome of each choice was not shown,
ensuring that decision-related responses were not influenced by
outcome-related responses, and choices were not influenced by the his-
tory of previous outcomes; (2) only one choice obtained at the end of the
experiment (i.e., participants did not accumulate points after each
choice; they were told that they will make a series of decisions but only
one, randomly selected choice will determine their reimbursement) to
remove any wealth effects; (3) the safe alternatives were not set to
indifference level, which allowed testing that the responses were in-
dependent of the value of the safe alternative; (4) no-choice trials were
not used (increasing power); (5) gambles represented real money
rather than points (increasing participant involvement); and (6) risky
gambles were studied at two different levels of mean gain, allowing
additional testing of value processing.
Four even-chance gambles were offered (£15/£45, £10/£50, £40/£80,
£30/£90). The first two had expected value of £30, with the first one
offering £15 or £45 and the second gamble offering £10 or £50. The other
pair of gambles had an expected value of £60, with the first one offering
£40 or £80 and the second one offering £30 or £90. Therefore, within each
pair, one gamblewas riskier than the other. The trial structurewas exactly
the same as in the first experiment, with the exception that no outcome
was shown. The second experiment comprised two sessions. Each session
consisted of 20 trials per gamble.
Estimating certainty equivalent. The CE was estimated as the frequency-
weighted average of the values of the safe alternative for which partic-
ipants at some point during the experiment chose both the risky and
safe option (supplemental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material).
Measuring risk aversion: certainty equivalents
We identified the risk aversion of each participant using the CEs. The
difference between the CEs of two gambles with the same EV
(CElow risk gamble  CEhigh risk gamble) reflects risk aversion. Less risk-
averse participants [with low difference between the CEs of the two gam-
bles (Fig. 1E, left side)] (for results of the second experiment, see
supplemental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental ma-
terial) perceive the increase in risk as less important compared with
more risk-averse participants (Fig. 1E, right side), who perceive the
risk manipulation as a significant escalation of risk. As a result, risk-
averse participants had lower safe alternatives for the high risk gamble
(Fig. 1C). A larger difference between the two CEs indicates higher
risk aversion.
Data analysis: imaging
Image acquisition and preprocessing parameters are described in the
supplemental data (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental ma-
terial). For each participant, all instances of a particular event type were
modeled through convolution with a canonical hemodynamic response
function (and its temporal and dispersion derivatives). For the first ex-
periment (analyzed with SPM2) (supplemental data, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material), in the first-level analysis, two
main events were included in the same model: presentation of gambles
and presentation of outcome. Both events had eight different conditions,
forming a 2 2 2 design: 2 (choice or no-choice) 2 (high or low risk
gamble condition)  2 (safe or risky choice). As a result, 16 regressors
were entered for each participant. For the second experiment (analyzed
with SPM5), one main event was included (presentation of options); the
event had 4 (four gambles)  2 (risky or safe choice)  8 conditions.
Errors were modeled as a different regressor. Movement parameters and
errors were modeled as covariates of no interest.
We tested for different temporal profiles of BOLD response [phasic
and sustained, with duration equal to the time until the go signal ap-
peared (5.5 s)]. For each participant, two different models were con-
structed to evaluate phasic (event-related design) and sustained response
(5.5 s epoch-based design) to the onset of options.We used a participant-
specific, fixed-effectsmodel for each event type. Parameters estimates for
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each regressor were calculated for each voxel (Friston et al., 1995).
Contrast images were constructed, demonstrating the size of the cer-
tain effect at each voxel. Subsequently, these data were entered into a
second-order, random-effects analysis (Friston et al., 1999). At that
level, contrast images were entered into one-sample t tests, simple regres-
sions, orANOVAs.Nonsphericity correction [as implemented in SPM2and
SPM5 and described by Glaser and Friston (2003)] was used at ANOVA
analyses.
Throughout, we used whole-brain or small-volume correction (svc)
for multiple comparisons controlled at p 0.05 (family-wise error). We
used small-volume correction with family-wise error controlled at p 
0.05 for the analysis for value and risk. Because previous studies (de-
scribed in Introduction) have implicated VSt and cingulate cortex for EV
and risk encoding, they were used as a priori anatomical regions of inter-
est (ROIs). Despite that many studies (Paulus et al., 2003; Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005; De Martino et al., 2006; Huettel et al., 2006) have exam-
ined the BOLD responses of risk-averse choices, none of them had incor-
porated in their analysis the model-free subjective estimation of the
riskiness of the gamble. Therefore, selecting an ROI (such as insula)
would have been unjustifiable; as a result, we used whole-brain correc-
tion for the related analysis. Therefore, right DLPFC activity was cor-
rected for the whole brain. Ventral striatum ROI was hand drawn in
MRIcro (Rorden and Brett, 2000) according to the anatomical descrip-
tion by Martinez et al. (2003), as used previously (Murray et al., 2008),
adjusted to the anatomical specificities of our sample. The cingulate
ROI included anterior and posterior cingulate and was constructed
using the Pickatlas Toolbox (Maldjian et al., 1997). Reported voxels
conform to MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) coordinate space,
with the right side of the image corresponding to the right side of the
brain. The most significant voxel (peak voxel) within the cluster of
activation is reported.
Results
Behavior: risk aversion
The mean CEs for the first experiment were 48.9 points (low risk
gamble) and 35.3 points (high risk gamble). For the second ex-
periment, the mean CEs were £25.7 (gamble offering £15/£45),
£23 (gamble £10/£50), £53.8 (gamble £40/£80), and £48.1 (gam-
ble £30/£90). The difference between the CEs of the low and high
risk gamble was used to measure risk aversion. For the first ex-
periment, risk aversion coefficients ranged from 2.5 to 31 (mean
of 13.57), with higher values implying higher risk aversion. For
the second experiment with a comparable risk assessment, risk
aversion coefficients ranged between £0.87 and £8 (mean of
£2.66) for the low EV gambles (£15/£45 and £10/£50) and be-
tween£1.5 and £12.08 (mean of 5.69) for the high EV gambles
(£40/£80 and £30/£90). For both the first and second experi-
ments, the values of theCEs of the low and high risk gambles were
statistically different from each other [first experiment, p 0.001
(paired t test); second experiment, p  0.001 (high mean gam-
bles) and p 0.005 (low mean gambles)].
Neuronal correlates of decision parameters
We tested the BOLD responses to the onset of the stimuli (pre-
sentation of the risky and safe alternative).
Magnitude/expected value coding
First experiment. We identified value coding in the brain. In our
paradigms, the expected value changes while keeping the proba-
bilities constant, according to the Rothschild–Stiglitz definition
of risk. In the first experiment, the difference between the mon-
etary values of the two safe alternatives varies across participants
(Fig. 1F). Therefore, an area encoding magnitude should be sen-
sitive to this variability. We measured the differential BOLD re-
sponse preceding the choice of the safe alternatives [comparison
B (Fig. 1D): Activitylow risk safe  Activityhigh risk safe] and corre-
lated it with the value difference between the two CEs. The dif-
ference between the values of the CE positively correlated with
increasing differential response of VSt (Fig. 2A, B1, solid line)
(peak at 14/6/2; R2  0.68; p  0.01, small-volume correc-
tion) (Worsley et al., 1996), suggesting that this area is sensitive to
magnitude. A similar result was found in the no-choice trials (Fig.
2B2, solid line) (20/8/8; R2 0.70; p 0.01, svc).
We also performed a paired t test comparing BOLD responses
to the safe alternatives. When all participants are included, the
striatal response does not survive correction. However, this ap-
parently negative result could be misleading: it is most likely a
result of the fact that, for participants that are close to risk neu-
trality, the difference in the values of the safe alternatives between
the two conditions of interest is very small (i.e., 3 units); con-
sequently, the associated small difference in BOLD response may
add primarily noise to the t test (but not to the correlation). In
otherwords, given that the difference in value for the almost-risk-
neutral agents is small, it should also be expected that the differ-
ence between the BOLD responses corresponding to these safe
alternatives should also be small.
In agreement with this reasoning, if we exclude the two
almost-risk-neutral participants, then a significant striatal re-
sponse differentiating between the values of the safe alternatives
appears also in the t test, even though the sample is smaller ( p
0.05, svc; 4/12/8 and12/20/4). This response is bilateral.
Note that the two excluded participants are not hand-
picked. They are the participants that have a very low differ-
ence between the safe alternatives they face; indeed, for these
two participants, the difference between safe alternatives was
1 SD away from (i.e., smaller than) the mean difference of
the safe alternatives of the group.
Interestingly, exactly the same happens in the no-choice trials:
including all participants, the striatal response seems to be unable
to differentiate between the different magnitudes. Again, exclud-
ing exactly the same participants, the striatal response signifi-
cantly differentiates between the two conditions ( p  0.05, svc;
4/10/2).
Together, these results suggest that the striatum codes value in
both choice and no-choice situations, as long as differences in
value are clearly present in the behavior.
Control for utility encoding. The experimental design also al-
lowed controlling for utility encoding: the striatal response
could actually be interpreted as representing utility (or pure
preferences), because larger differences between the values of
the safe alternatives represent larger differences in utility as
well. We controlled for this confound by using the comparison
between the two risky options (comparison A: Activityhigh risk
gamble  Activitylow risk gamble). Note that gambles have the same
utility with their corresponding safe alternatives. If striatum en-
codes utility, then the differential activity between the two risky
options should also correlate with the differences between the
two safe alternatives. We found that striatal activity did not
change with respect to utility differences (Fig. 2B1,B2, dotted
lines) (R2 0.0, NS) between the low and the high risk gamble.
An analysis of the interaction effects, comparing the slopes of
the two regression lines, was significant for both the choice
and no-choice trials ( p  0.05).
Second experiment.We used the data from the second experi-
ment and compared the activity between the high and low mean
gambles to test whether striatum activity changes with EV. We
first compared the safe conditions (in which the subsequent
choice was a safe alternative) with different magnitudes (high vs
low values of safe choice); the comparison confirmed striatal sen-
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sitivity to magnitude (Fig. 2B3) (peak at 12/12/8; p  0.05,
svc). In addition, we also compared the BOLD responses preced-
ing a choice of a high versus a low EV gamble (i.e., including only
the occasion in which the choice is risky), and we found a sus-
tained response to the gambles with higher EV, again in striatum
(Fig. 2B4) (peak at 12/6/8; p 0.05, svc).
Risk coding
First experiment. To test risk coding, we compared the BOLD
response preceding choices of the high risk gamble with the re-
sponse preceding low risk gamble choices. dACC (Fig. 2C) (peak
at 8/30/34; p  0.05) showed higher BOLD response when the
subsequent choice was the high risk gamble compared with when
the choicewas the low risk gamble). Interestingly, such an activity
differentiating between high and low risk trials was not found in
no-choice trials, potentially signifying that the dACC response is
mainly choice specific (interaction analysis, p 0.05).
Control for magnitude or utility coding.We also tested whether
the dACC signal is independent frommagnitude or utility varia-
tions. To control for these, we compared the dACC response to
the safe alternatives of each gamble (Activitylow risk safeActivi-
tyhigh risk safe). On average, the value of the low risk safe alternative
(mean of 48.92) is higher than the value of the high risk safe
alternative (mean of 35.34). If the ACC signal was in fact encod-
ing either EV or utility, then it should differentiate between the
two safe alternatives.We observed a significant interaction show-
ing that, whereas dACC differentiates between the two risky op-
tions, it shows no differential activity between the corresponding
safe alternatives ( p  0.05, whole-brain correction). Moreover,
dACCactivity does not covarywith risk aversion (R2 0.05,NS).
This potentially suggests that dACC encodes risk in an objective
manner, regardless of magnitude, utility, or the subjective evalu-
ation of the riskiness of the gambles (risk aversion).
Second experiment: risk coding with control for fictive/regret sig-
nals. In the first experiment, because of the indifference level
setting, the safe alternative of the high risk gamble is lower
compared with the alternative of the low risk gamble. The
difference in the BOLD response between high and low risk
gambles might therefore be attributable to the fact that their
safe alternatives differ in magnitude (Loomes and Sugden,
1982; Lohrenz et al., 2007). Accordingly, this difference could
actually reflect an inverse coding of the foregone safe amount.
On the contrary, in the second experiment, the safe alterna-
tives are approximately the same across gambles with the same
EV, because they were not adjusted to indifference levels;
therefore, the comparison between high and low risk gambles
does not suffer from the possibility that the safe alternatives
are also different (as is the case in the first experiment). To
control for this possibility, we used data from the second ex-
perimental paradigm, in which the offered safe alternatives are
not set to indifference level and are approximately the same
across participants and gambles with the same EV. Again, the
risk encoding function of dACCwas found when we compared
the gambles offering £40/£80 and £30/£90, in the same way as
in the first experiment. Dorsal ACCwas sensitive to higher risk
(Fig. 2D2) (peak at 16/22/28; p  0.05, svc). As in the first
experiment, this difference weakly and insignificantly corre-
lated with risk attitudes, expressed as the difference between
the CEs (R 2  0.16, NS).
Figure 2. Brain activity related to value and risk. All BOLD responses presented were modeled on presentation of the stimuli (options) and are estimated by the related regression slope
parameter estimates (). A, Value coding by VSt. Response location in VSt sensitive to magnitude/EV differences ( p 0.05, small volume correction, displayed at p 0.01). Red, First
experiment, comparing safe alternatives, choice situation; yellow, first experiment, same in no-choice situation; green, second experiment, comparing safe choices having different
magnitude; blue, second experiment, comparing risky choices having different EV. Darkest voxels reflect common activation areas. B, Quantitative value coding by ventral striatum. B1,
Increasing difference in the magnitude of the safe alternatives of each gamble (x-axis) correlates with the differential VSt response to the choice of these alternatives ( y-axis) (solid line;
R 2 0.68; p 0.0005). This signal does not change when we compare high risk (HR) and low risk (LR) gambles (comparison A in Fig. 1, signaling either risk or utility) (dotted line). B2,
The same area shows a similar activation pattern in no-choice trials. B3, B4, In addition, a neighboring voxel (peak at22/6/8) distinguishes between high and low expected value in
the second experiment. B4 is essentially the same as B1, with the exception that we now compare the two risky options with different expected values, whereas in the first experiment,
we compared safe options with different magnitudes. C, Risk coding by dACC. Comparing activity emerging from a choice of the high risk option to activity related to a choice of the low
risk one, risk-sensitive areas were identified. This comparison reached significance in dACC ( p 0.05, displayed at p 0.01). This signal also does not covary with risk attitudes or the
utility of each option. Red, First experiment, comparing high and low risk gambles, choice condition; yellow, second experiment, comparing high and low risk gambles. D, Quantitative
coding of risk by dACC. dACC shows higher response for the high risk gamble than to the low risk option. D1, An interaction effects analysis suggested that this sensitivity of dACC to the
high risk occurs only in choice trials and not in no-choice trials ( p 0.05). Error bars represent SEM. D2, The same area showed increasing response to high risk compared with low risk
in the second experiment, in which the safe alternatives are not set to indifference level. This suggests that the dACC response to higher risk is not attributable to the lower value of the
alternative offer (which is the case in the first experiment).
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Differential response to risky options according to risk aversion
First experiment. The fact that participants attached different CEs
to each gamble suggests that the increase in risk (from the low risk
to the high risk gamble) was perceived differently by each indi-
vidual. This subjective evaluation of risk is reflected in the differ-
ence between the CEs. In both experiments, participants
demonstrated sufficient variability of risk attitudes, enabling us to
study the corresponding differences in BOLD response (Friston et
al., 1999). To determine whether these individual differences in
behavioral responses to risk are reflected in brain activity, we
correlated the difference in the brain response to the two gambles
[comparison A (Fig. 1D): Activitylow risk gamble  Activityhigh risk
gamble] with risk aversion [defined as the difference between the
values of the two CEs (CElow risk gamble  CEhigh risk gamble)]. A
strong correlation (R2 0.89; p 0.01, whole-brain corrected)
(Fig. 3A) was evident in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) (48/32/
14) (Fig. 3A): increasing risk aversion provoked better differen-
tiation between the BOLD responses of the two gambles,
reflecting the behavioral difference in theCEs. This result is based
on the increased IFG activity preceding a choice of the low risk
gamble in correlation with risk aversion (Fig. 3B); on the con-
trary, activity for the high risk gamble remains unchanged (again
with respect to risk aversion). A similar, yet less strong, result was
also found in the no-choice trials (peak at 48/26/14; R2  0.77;
p  0.05, svc). IFG activity differentiated between high and low
risk according to risk aversion, in a similar way to choice trials.
There were no other areas surviving whole-brain correc-
tion. Nevertheless, given that insula has been implicated in
risk-averse choices, we tested whether the BOLD response of this
area correlates with risk aversion, using an ROI analysis. In the first
experiment, there is a nonsignificant trend of anterior insula cor-
relating with risk attitudes. However, this activation does not
survive at all in the second experiment.We are therefore forced to
reject the hypothesis that insula BOLD responses correlate with
risk attitudes.
Second experiment. In the second experiment, we correlated
the differences in the BOLD response of gambles £30/£90 and
£40/£80 with risk aversion. Again, right IFG BOLD response
(peak at 52/14/22; p  0.05, false discovery rate, svc) correlated
with risk aversion, in a similar manner as in the first experiment
(positive correlation in parallel with increasing risk aversion)
(supplemental data, available at www.jneurosci.org as supple-
mental material). Hence, these results suggest that IFG BOLD
response increases with lower-risk gambles, and this increase is
more pronounced in risk-averse agents.
Decoding the behavioral choice by BOLD response
Wenext sought to identify whether neuronal signals solely reflect
decision-making parameters or, are, in addition, relevant to ac-
tual choice behavior. Our analysis so far identified three different
structures preferentially processing basic decision parameters:
VSt, dACC, and IFG, reflecting magnitude, risk, and risk aver-
sion, respectively.
Using a similar methodology with previous studies (Kuhnen
and Knutson, 2005; Knutson et al., 2007), we used binary logistic
regression (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989) to determine whether
the combination of BOLD responses correlates with a risky or
safe choice and also to elucidate the potential contribution of
each structure to decisionmaking.We used three variables (trial-
by-trial activity of VSt, dACC, and IFG) and the actual choice
made on each trial (risky or safe) as the dependent variable.
Overall coefficients of the logistic model related to activity of
each structure were significant (Table 1), suggesting that all three
structures contributed to the choice. Importantly, the overall lo-
gistic regression coefficients allowed us to clarify the exact role of
each structure. Logistic regression coefficients were positive for
VSt and dACC activity (BVSt 1.161, BdACC 0.966; p 0.05),
whereas IFG had a negative coefficient (BIFG  0.326; p 
0.05). A similar result was obtained in the second experiment
Figure 3. Modulation of IFG activity by risk aversion. A, Increased differential IFG activity with risk aversion. y-axis represents the difference of the IFG parameter estimate of the BOLD response
preceding a choice of the low risk gambleminus the corresponding IFG parameter preceding a choice of the high risk gamble. x-axis represents risk aversion of each participant, as measured by the
monetary difference between the CE of the two gambles (CElow risk gamble CEhigh risk gamble). The more risk averse the participant, the larger the difference in BOLD response in IFG ( p 0.05,
whole-brain correction). The first image is from the first experiment. The next three images depict sagittal, axial, and coronal planes showing the common right DLPFC activated voxels for the
risk-attitude-related contrast. Red, First experiment, choice condition; yellow, first experiment, no-choice condition; green, secondexperiment.B, Correlationof BOLD response in IFG to safe and low
risk gambles with individual risk aversion. The IFG response slope increases with gambles of decreasing risk, thus providing better discrimination of lower risks in risk-averse participants. This
selective codingof a “safety signal” formore risk-averseparticipants is verifiedby the similar (increasing) activity of the samevoxel as a response to safe choices. In contrast, activity related to a choice
of the high risk option does not correlatewith individual risk aversion. TheR 2 values for each regression line are as follows: low risk gamble, 0.49; low risk safe, 0.46; high risk safe, 0.34; high risk gamble, 0.00.
Table 1. Logistic regression parameters detecting decisions from ventral striatum,
dACC, and IFG BOLD response
Variables Coefficients () SE Wald statistic p Odds ratio Exp(B)
VSt 1.161 0.152 58.131 0.000 3.195
dACC 0.966 0.136 50.528 0.000 2.626
IFG 0.326 0.158 4.276 0.039 0.722
Constant 0.141 0.055 6.549 0.010 0.869
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(supplemental data, available at www.j-
neurosci.org as supplemental material).
This indicates that increasing activity of
VSt andACC increases the probability of a
risky choice, whereas the IFG activity pat-
tern does the opposite (Fig. 4C). To fur-
ther investigate the contribution of IFG
activity to choice behavior, we identified
how the model-based probabilities of a
risky choice change with different levels of
IFG activity, in relation to the activity of
VSt and dACC. Increasing IFG activity
moves the psychophysical function to-
ward the right (Fig. 4D). Thus, the overall
logistic regression model suggests that,
given an increase in IFGactivity, increased
VSt and ACC activity is required to obtain
the same probability of a risky choice.
Above, we presented the logistic re-
gression results from a fixed-effects anal-
ysis to evaluate the overall contribution of
the three structures, independent of vari-
ability in between-subjects task character-
istics (which is the case for the first
experiment), as it was done in previous
studies (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005).
Adopting a stricter random-effects ap-
proach, we next calculated the subject-
specific coefficients of the logistic regression
and then evaluated these parameters in
second-level random-effects tests.
For the first experiment, striatal and
dACC responses were significant ( p 
0.001), whereas IFG approached signifi-
cance ( p  0.10). Yet, it should be re-
membered that the BOLD response of the
IFG is more relevant as risk aversion in-
creases. Therefore, if we only include par-
ticipants that are at least slightly risk
averse (i.e., the difference between theCEs
is3 monetary units, which is 1 SD away
from the average value of the sample),
then the IFG response indeed becomes
significant at p  0.05. This implies that
the IFG BOLD response plays a role in the forthcoming choice
primarily when the participant is risk averse.
To test this notion further, we performed a similar random-
effects analysis also in the second experiment. In agreementwith the
findings from the first experiment, the significance of the IFGBOLD
response for the logistic regressionmodel increaseswhenwe exclude
risk-neutral participants (responses of the three structures are all
significant at p 0.05). These data further reinforce the notion that
dACC, IFG, and striatal BOLD responses contribute to decisions in
risky situations, with IFG response being more relevant to the deci-
sions of risk-averse agents.
Using the coefficients, we determined the model-based com-
puted probability of a risky choice, given the activity of VSt,
dACC, and IFG on each trial. We then calculated the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve comparing these model-
based probabilities of a risky choice with the actual choice. The
ROC analysis describes how effectively an ideal observer would
detect a signal (a risky choice, in our case) in the presence of
noise. TheROChas been effectively used (Britten et al., 1996;Chan-
drasekaran et al., 2007; Thielscher andPessoa, 2007) to elucidate the
relation between neuronal responses and perceptual choices.
For the choice trials of the first experiment, the model detected
the behavioral choice significantly well above chance (ROC 0.77;
p 0.01) (Fig. 4A).Weused exactly the samemethod in the second
experiment and again found a similar ROCvalue (ROC 0.74; p
0.01) (Fig. 4A). In addition, the ROC values derived from models
using each structure separately were lower (Fig. 4A). In the no-
choice trials, the ROC value was also lower (ROC 0.72).
Stricter validation analyses confirmed the generalizability of
the detective power of the model. Specifically, leave-one-out
cross-validation produced a similar, statistically significant ROC
value (ROC  0.65), which was slightly lower because of the
smaller sample size inherent in the procedure.
Discussion
Fromboth a behavioral and theoretical perspective, the value and
risk of an option along with the agent’s risk aversion are the basic
Figure 4. Detection of risky choices by combined brain signals of decision parameters. A, Evaluation of detection. By applying
binary logistic regression, we tested whether a model combining signals of VSt, dACC, and IFG (corresponding to EV, risk, and risk
aversion) could detect the choice on a trial-by-trial basis. ROC values depicted here indicate the model-based probability of
correctly detecting a risky choice. The ROC values for the combined model (using activity from all structures) are 0.77 (first
experiment; top left) and 0.74 (second experiment; top right). Both are significantly different from chance performance (ROC
0.5; straight diagonal lines; see also the right) and models using the BOLD response from one structure only (bottom right).
B, Contribution of brain structures to probability of risky choice. x-axis represents level of BOLD responses (of VSt, dACC, or IFG),
whereas y-axis represents the probability of a risky choice, as computed by the regression equations. Increasing activity of VSt and
dACC increases the probability of a risky choice. On the contrary, increasing activity of IFG increases the probability of a safe choice.
C, Effect of IFG activity. x-axis represents the activity of both VSt and dACC. Dotted line (left) depicts the probability of a risky choice
(as computed by the regression equation), with respect to VSt and dACC activity, when IFG activity is low.When the activity of IFG
is high (solid line), then higher compensatory activity of VSt and dACC is required to elicit the same probability of a risky choice.
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factors implicated in the choice behavior. Our approach in study-
ing choice behavior was to first identify the components of the
system (magnitude, risk, and risk aversion) and then to piece
them together to produce a function relating them to a behavioral
outcome (i.e., the choice). To achieve this, we first located the
neuronal responses that are more relevant to decision factors. In
the final step, we tested whether these responses can indeed de-
scribe the function of the system (i.e., detect the behavioral
choice).
Previous studies have uncovered the neural correlates of inde-
pendent decision factors as well. Our design disentangled deci-
sion parameters from utility encoding, took into account the
behaviorally demonstrated risk attitudes of each participant, and
minimized any learning elements. The present findings suggest
that the computational and theoretical deconstruction of the de-
cision procedure into specific parameters meets with distinct
BOLD responses, which could contribute crucial inputs for ac-
tual choices.
In two different experiments, in which important behavioral
parameters were differentiated, we found distinct neuronal re-
sponses toward different decision factors. The striatum was par-
ticularly responsive to changes inmagnitude, dACCwas involved
in mainly objective risk coding, and IFG signaled risk aversion.
Importantly, by combining the information from these different
brain regions, these BOLD responses were informative enough to
allow an ideal observer to detect the overt choice: a risky choice
was more probable when striatal and cingulate activity was
higher, whereas increased BOLD signals from IFG correlated
with increased probability of a safe choice.
High correlations between BOLD responses and personality
traits have been criticized recently (Vul et al., 2009). Although the
critique is highly controversial and disputable (Lieberman et al.,
2009), our study nevertheless escapes the criticismbecausewe use
two separate sets of data (and experimental designs) to evaluate
our hypotheses; in both experiments, the BOLD response of the
brain regions correlated with the behavioral measurement. In
addition, the principal measurement (risk aversion) is not ap-
proached as a personality trait but rather as a behavioralmeasure-
ment. Finally, the regions reflecting individual differences in risk
processing were identified independently from those coding risk.
Value, objective, and subjective risk
Our results show that VSt activation increases with increasing
value. Importantly, our analysis suggests that striatal activity en-
coded value, independent from utility. Because of our design, the
term “value” refers to either “magnitude” (first experiment) or
“expected value” (second experiment). We need to underline
that our experiments do not clarify to which of these two param-
eters the VSt is responsive to, as such a study would require a
design that includes different levels of probabilities. This should
be addressed in future studies, although similar issues have been
tested by previous reports; our results are in line with their results
linking striatal activity to computing value (or processing its
components) (Knutson et al., 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Yacubian et
al., 2006; Tobler et al., 2007).
According to the present results, dACC activity increases
when the forthcoming choice has higher risk. The magnitude of
this increase does not covary with individual differences in the
estimation of risk (risk aversion). Therefore, dACCactivity seems
to preferentially mirror an objective metric of risk. In addition,
we found no differences in dACC activity with respect to the
utility of the subsequent choice. Previous studies have implicated
dACC activity with the volatility of the reward environment
(Behrens et al., 2007), whereas Critchley et al. (2001) relate the
increased BOLD response of ACC in anticipation of risky out-
comes to autonomic arousal. We also control for conflict of
choice (Carter et al., 1998), which is a common function ascribed
to ACC, because both alternatives are equally preferred; there-
fore, conflict in every trial of the first experiment is maximal. A
possible caveat of our study is that both experiments have a rela-
tively small number of participants; this might significantly
lower the power to find correlations. Although the size of our
sample was sufficient to detect correlations in IFG, the fact
that we did not find a correlation of dACC BOLD response to
risk does not necessarily preclude the possibility that this area
might also be sensitive in subject-wise differences in risk
assessments.
However, it should be emphasized that the brain responses
attributed to specific decision parameters are not exclusive but
mainly preferential. Our study adopted a formal definition of
risk, which is independent of changes in probabilities; this is a
crucially different aspect of risk (Rushworth and Behrens, 2008).
The control of probability might be a contributing factor for not
finding risk signals in brain structures such as insula (Critchley et
al., 2001; Preuschoff et al., 2008) and areas of prefrontal cortex
(Elliott et al., 1999; Rogers et al., 1999), yet a thorough examina-
tion of risk-related choice behavior necessitates the detailed, sep-
arate identification of the different facets of risk. Given that
variance is the first moment of a distribution, it is evident that it
is one of the primary aspects of risk.
IFG BOLD responses found in this study reflected risk aver-
sion. The currently observed BOLD response of IFG is located
within right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex whose stimulation ac-
cordingly modulates risk aversion (Knoch et al., 2006; Fecteau et
al., 2007). Our results demonstrate that this area does not influ-
ence the objective evaluation of risk but rather the subjective
perception of the riskiness of the option. Additional analysis sug-
gests that this IFG BOLD response functions as a “safety” signal,
because it shows higher response to safer options, especially for
more risk-averse participants.
Combined BOLD signals contributing to decision making
To use an analogy, in perceptual decisions, the choice can be
decoded by comparing neuronal activity between areas that are
selectively tuned to the basic characteristics of each option [for
instance, areas sensitive to either faces or houses (Heekeren et al.,
2004)]. Lee et al. (2007) suggest that, to make a choice, the brain
should collect information on different decision parameters and
then combine this information in an effective way to produce the
choice. In economic choices, specific values are assigned to the
individual options; these values aremodulated, among others, by
the risk of the options. The conjecture that risk has an influence on
value constitutes the key characteristic of one of the prominent the-
ories in economic decision making, namely the mean variance ap-
proach (Levy andMarkowitz, 1979; Preuschoff et al., 2006;Rangel et
al., 2008). Essentially, the underlying hypothesis is that the overt
choice is the output of internal processes combining the neuronal
information pertaining to each choice parameter. Our experiment
followed this rationale of combined decision parameters.
We indeed found a group of areas that are sensitive to specific
decision parameters. Logistic regression analysis of signals from
different regions revealed relationships not obvious from single-
structure analysis. The relationship between activity and choice
can be approximated by a competing activity between striatum
and dACC on one hand, correlating with riskier choices, and IFG
on the other hand, holding an inhibitory, risk-averse role.
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Our analysis brings forward the possibility of evaluating the
effect of “virtual” lesions in the implicated areas. Striatal and
cingulate lesions would potentially be associated with less risk-
averse (and more risk neutral) choices. A striatal lesion could
reduce the ability to evaluate magnitude, an effect that is also
implied by negative motivational changes in patients with globus
pallidus lesions (Vijayaraghavan et al., 2008). Nevertheless, such
a lesion could be compensated by functions in other areas,
namely ventromedial prefrontal cortex. In addition, our predic-
tion is that lateral prefrontal cortex lesions will lead to riskier
choices, which, as mentioned previously, is in accordance with
neuromodulatory studies (Knoch et al., 2006; Fecteau et al.,
2007). A recent study (Gianotti et al., 2009) also suggested that
participants with higher baseline cortical activity in the right pre-
frontal cortex are more risk averse. In addition, patients with
predominantly right-sided prefrontal lesions demonstrate a risk-
ier behavior (Clark et al., 2003).
It should be noted that individual brain regions, and especially
striatum, independently have high ROC values. The latter sug-
gests that encoding of isolated decision parameters already con-
tains information able to decode the choice, yet the incorporation
and appropriate combination of information stemming from
aptly selected regions improves the overall representation of the
choice behavior.
Cognitive functions such as decision making might necessi-
tate the combination of signals from different brain areas instead
of contributions from a single structure. Such distributed neuro-
nal contributions to cognitive functions have also been found in
other paradigms, such as emotional perceptual decisions (Pessoa
and Padmala, 2005) and a probabilistic-reversal learning task
(Hampton and O’Doherty, 2007). Our study demonstrates that
neural combinations of information can be beneficial on eco-
nomic decisions under risk, as well.
It has been suggested (MacDonald et al., 2000; Fleck et al.,
2006) that dACC engagement indexes conflict and the need for
cognitive control (Barch et al., 2001), whereas DLPFC assumes a
more evaluative role, including cognitive control and response
selection. Importantly, Rushworth et al. (2004) suggest that the
main function of ACC is to perform a cost–benefit analysis to
guide action. The present results fit in that framework. Dorsal
ACC evaluates the riskiness of the situation (which may corre-
spond to an evaluation of costs and benefits), indexing the need
to engage cognitive control over the competing choice between a
risky and a safe alternative. Higher risk requires higher cognitive
control comparedwith lowrisk trials.Therefore, dorsalACCactivity
signals whether and to what extent cognitive control is needed ac-
cording to the riskinessof the situation,whereas IFG/DLPFCactivity
idiosyncratically guides the choice according to risk attitudes.
In conclusion, our analysis sheds light on the mechanisms
used in decisionmaking under risk. Behavioral evidence suggests
that the output of the choice process heavily depends on the
statistical properties of the options. This implies that the brain
not only encodes these properties but also combines them to
produce the overt choice. An analogous mechanism is suggested
by our data. From a more general point of view, the generation
and combination of neuronal signals representing lower-level
properties of the stimulus might be a general decision-making
mechanism across different modalities (Heekeren et al., 2008).
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